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ABSTRACT
A PRELIMINARY INVESTIGATION TO DETERMINE THE ECONOMIC 
IMPLICATIONS OF THE "404" PERMIT FOR CONSTRUCTING 
AGRICULTURALLY RELATED RESERVOIRS IN ARKANSAS
A descriptive inquiry of the economic consequences 
of federal regulations which restrict the construction of 
agriculturally related reservoirs in Arkansas's wetlands 
is presented in this report. The applicable economic 
principles are identifyed and applied to the situation 
without the quantifiable information necessary to 
evaluate the alternatives. The d ifficu lty  of collecting 
the required quantifiable information necessitates the 
formulation of a different technique to unravel the 
dilemma. An alternative method for resolving the 
wetlands allocation question is presented for a public 
sector decision maker. This unconventional technique 
suggests that i t  may be desirable to estimate and compare 
the costs associated with the possible errors of a 
wetlands land use regulation in terms of both their 
consequences and likelihood.
R. K. FORD and C. R. BRITTON
Completion Report to the U.S. Department of the Interior, 
Geological Survey, Reston, Virginia, June, 1990.
Keywords: Arkansas Wetlands, Economic implications, 
Water allocation, Agricultural reservoirs.
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FOREWORD
This project has turned out to be more demanding 
than was f irs t  anticipated. In it ia lly , i t  appeared to be 
a relatively straight forward application of economics to 
a topical situation. However, as work proceeded, the 
quagmire of elaborately developed economic theories 
addressing the many overlapping issues of this project 
slowed its  completion. Concurrently, the "topical 
situation" changed so that the nature of the problem took 
on different dimensions. As a result, the thrust 
gradually shifted to a more generalized perspective. The 
in it ia l proposal called for "a fu lly  developed decision 
model [to be] formulated from economic theory." In an 
attempt to balance the in it ia l goals with the ongoing 
changes in the situation as well as with the m ultip lic ity 
of approaches found in the literature, a generalized 
economic model for analyzing the situation is presented 
and discussed. An attempt has been made to introduce the 
relevant economic topics into the discussion and to 
organize them into a consolidated decision-making 
framework.
The reader is reminded that economics is a science 
that frequently deals with topics that are inherently
i i
judgmental. As is the case with this project, the 
"correct" answer cannot be derived from positive (i.e ., 
non-judgmental) economic analysis regardless of how well 
economic theory is applied. At best, positive economic 
analysis can identify choices and offer a comparison of 
their relative merits. The actual selection from these 
choices is not an activity that economists are 
particularly trained to do. When considering public 
sector topics, such as are dealt with in this project, 
selection of "the correct answer" must be le ft to the 
po litica l process. However, the following report should 
assist Arkansas's decision makers with selecting the most 
appropriate po litica l agenda to pursue.
i i i
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INTRODUCTION
Recently, the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers (Corps) 
and the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) have agreed 
on the specific requirements for the issuance of a "404" 
permit for the construction of various kinds of 
reservoirs in Arkansas wetlands. Although based upon the 
1972 Federal Water Pollution Control Act, i t  is the 
direct result of case law and various negotiations that 
have taken place between these two regulating agencies.
From a somewhat larger perspective i t  appears that 
a new conflict is developing between conservationists and 
landowners, or between those who express their concern 
for protecting, conserving, and improving the environment 
through public sector institutions and those members of 
the private sector with vested property right interest 
such as wetland owners, predominantly farmers. In it ia lly  
one might suppose that this developing conflict is a sign 
of "modern times" and is a function of recent scientific 
discoveries concerning ecosystems and America's 
accelerated rate of abuse of them. During the post World 
War I I  era considerable attention has been given to 
America's "sprawling urbanization," and the "disposable 
society."
1
However, the following quotation from a 1931 academic 
journal is useful in putting this condition into 
perspective:
Contemplation of the world's disappearing 
supplies of minerals, forests and other 
exhaustible assets has led to demands for 
regulation of their exploitation. The feeling 
that these products are now too cheap for the 
good of future generations, that they are 
being selfishly exploited at too rapid a rate, 
and that in consequence of their excessive 
cheapness they are being produced and consumed 
wastefully has given rise to the conservation 
movement.
The current conflict, although not new in its  
fundamental nature is novel because the level of public 
sector control over private property in this particular
area is different (i.e., more direct and stringent) than
in the past2. Like most conflicts concerning property
rights, the emotional component can be seen in various
articles of the popular press. The following few
examples are presented as symptomatic of the intense
nature of this dispute:
1 H o t e l l i n g ,  H a r o ld ,  "T h e  E co n o m ics  o f  E x h a u s t ib le  R e s o u rc e s " ,  J o u r n a l  o f  
P o l i t i c a l  E co no m y. A p r i l  1 9 3 1 , V o l .  3 9 , p ag es  1 3 7 -1 7 5 .
2 I t  i s  i n t e r e s t i n g  t o  n o te  t h a t  one o f  th e  m a jo r  c a t a l y s t s  o f  t h i s  c u r r e n t  
c o n f l i c t  c o n c e r n in g  w e t la n d s  was a ch ange  i n  d e f i n i t i o n .  When th e  c o u r t s  h e ld  
t h a t  a p a r t i c u l a r  t r a c t  o f  la n d  was to  be  c o n s id e r e d  a w e t la n d  w hen i t  h a d  n o t  
p r e v io u s ly  b e e n  so  c o n s id e r e d ,  th e  r e s u l t  was t h a t  l e g i s l a t i v e  la w s  t h a t  h a d  b e e n  
i n  e x is t e n c e  f o r  a c o n s id e r a b le  t im e  to o k  on  new m e a n in g  as th e  d e f i n i t i o n  o f  th e  
te rm  'w e t la n d '  was e x p a n d e d . (See A p p e n d ix  1 . )
2
In a normal world, a clean environment and 
private property are perfectly compatible. As 
residents of Leningrad or Leipzig know, 
private owners do far better by preservation 
than socialists have done. But in their zeal 
to cleanse the world of man's sins, U.S. 
enviros have been ignoring the Constitution's 
Fifth Amendment ban against the 'taking' of 
private property without compensation.3
In addition to your usual ranting and raving 
about environmental regulation, your editorial 
proclaims that 'private property rights lead 
to a cleaner environment because they imply 
individual responsibility.' Has i t  occurred 
to you that the unchecked exercise of 'private 
property rights' led to many of the thousands 
of abandoned toxic-waste sites now being 
addressed by the federal Superfund law and 
similar state statues.
In a letter to Senators, American Agriculture 
Movement national director, David Senter, 
wrote that U.S. farmers stand to lose '25% to 
50% of their equity due to the outright taking 
of their land by the federal government. ' 
Federal agencies, he added, 'are using 
wetlands delineation, clean water, and other 
laws as a way to take control of vast areas of 
farmland, much of which has been farmed for 
decades and has nothing to do with permanent 
wetlands.
Farmers in particular believe that they are bearing 
an unfair burden of this current round of public versus
3 "EPA v .  P r iv a te  P r o p e r ty " ,  E d i t o r i a l ,  W a ll S t r e e t  J o u r n a l . A u g u s t 27,
1990.
A J .B .  R u h l,  " L e t t e r s  to  th e  E d i t o r :  W ho's A l l  Wet on W e tla n d s  Is s u e ? "  W a ll 
S t r e e t  J o u r n a l . S ep tem ber 25, 1990




These farmers have been shocked to learn that 
the Exxon Valdez Oil spill or chemical 
carelessness like Love Canal are not the 
environmental crimes of the century, at least 
in the eyes of government regulators. The 
Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) has 
reserved its stiffest criminal and c iv il 
penalties for wetlands violators."
In Colorado, Larry Gerbaz faced $40 million in 
fines for rebuilding a levee after the Corps 
refused to say whether he needed a permit.
... 'I  asked the Corps of Engineers i f  I 
needed a permit, and they wouldn't te ll me,' 
says Larry. 'After the river had come within 
20 yards of my house, I pushed up rocks from 
the bottom of the creek and rebuilt the levee.
What we did amounted to putting the river back 
into its original course.' says Larry. 'The 
fine for rebuilding the levee without a 
Section 404 permit is supposed to be $25,000 a 
day for each day since the work was completed 
in 1985. ... Larry has since sold his 19
acres, and the new owner w ill not permit him 
to tear down the rebuilt levee. Gerbaz has 
offered to do bank stabilization work and 
plant willows. But he says he won't pay a 
fine. 'I t  makes your skin crawl to agree to a 
settlement when you don't believe you were in 
the wrong,' he says. 'Before this is over, I 
think I may go to ja il. ' Jail or not, farmers 
across the country who operate on wetlands are 
seeing the consequences of incurring the ire 
of government agencies which, unlike USDA, do 
not understand agriculture.
On the conservationists' side of the issue, many
6 T a y lo r ,  M a rc ia  Z. and D a r r e l l  S m ith , "New W e tla n d s  R u le s  D ra in  F a rm e rs " , 
Farm J o u r n a l J u ly  1990, page 16.
7 I b i d ,  page 19.
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emotionally 'loaded' articles have also appeared in the 
popular press:
An exciting concept is taking shape on the 
drawing boards of Conservation Department 
engineers .. . Eagle Bluffs Wildlife Area is 
attracting national attention for its 
innovative concept: use water that would 
otherwise be discharged as waste to create a 
wetland ecosystem.
As one would suspect, elected officials find 
themselves in the middle of this controversy and are 
frequently holding public hearings and/or sponsoring 
bills to appease various segments of the public in 
attempts to improve the situation. As an example, 
consider the following:
Congressman Hammerschmidt criticized as 'totally 
unreasonable' the Corps' proposed permitting fee 
increases, which would raise the charge for review 
of individual, non-commercial permits from the 
current $10 to $500, and the fee imposed for 
commercial development, from $100 to $2,000
'Since January 1989, I have become increasingly 
alarmed at the regulatory overkill pursued by your 
agency in regards to certain lands that suddenly 
met new wetlands definitions,' Bumpers said in a 
letter to the Corps. 'Although I am sensitive to 
the cost inherent in the administration of your 
various permit programs, I must object to your
8 E d i to r s ,  "W e tla n d s  fro m  W a s te ," M is s o u r i C o n s e r v a t io n is t . A p r i l  1990.
9 News re le a s e  fro m  Congressman John P au l Ham m erschm idt, J a n u a ry  3, 1991.
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proposal for such large fee increases.'10
The controversy continues in the press and in the 
halls of Congress as can be seen on the front page of 
local newspapers. (See Appendix 2.) Although the issue 
seems to be an insolvable struggle between "property 
righters" and the environmentalists, there are ways to 
examine this apparent dilemma in economic terminology 
which will facilitate finding a resolution agreeable to 
rational persons.11
In order to scrutinize this obvious quandary in 
economic terms, i t  is first necessary to focus the 
discussion on the small portion of this national debate 
which concerns this paper namely concentrating on the 
construction of agriculturally associated reservoirs 
(viz., farm ponds) on real estate classified as 
"wetlands." The fundamental objective of this report is 
to identify the economic issues and tradeoffs germane to
6
10 "Bum pers A n g ry  a t  C orps P roposed W e tla n d  Fees Draws C r i t i c i s m " , A rka n sa s  
G a z e t te . December 11 , 1990.
11 I t  has been  su g g e s te d  t h a t  e ve ryo n e  w i t h  a v e s te d  in t e r e s t  i n  e i t h e r  o f  
th e  tw o c o n f l i c t i n g  s id e s  may be to o  p e r s o n a l ly  in v o lv e d  ( i . e . ,  e m o t io n a l o r  
f i n a n c i a l l y  c o n n e c te d )  to  q u a l i f y  as a " r a t i o n a l  p e r s o n ."  Land ow ners who a re  
c a m p a ig n in g  a g a in s t  th e  a t t e n u a t io n  o f  t h e i r  p r o p e r ty  r i g h t s  a re  u n q u e s t io n a b ly  
p e r s o n a l ly  in v o lv e d .  Less o b v io u s , b u t  s t i l l  p e r s o n a l ly  in v o lv e d ,  a re  members 
( o r  s y m p a th iz e rs )  o f  e n v iro n m e n ta l g ro u p s . I t  s h o u ld  be a ckn o w le d g e d  t h a t  th e s e  
p e o p le  a ls o  have  p e rs o n a l in t e r e s t s  a t  s ta k e  s in c e  t h e i r  o b je c t iv e  i s  to  com pel 
la n d  ow ners to  use w e tla n d s  a c c o rd in g  to  s ta n d a rd s  p a r t l y  d e te rm in e d  b y  them .
the problem of deciding the "appropriate" degree of 
government control which should be exerted over a wetland 
property owner desiring to construct a farm pond. Toward 
this end, the next section w ill identify and briefly 
discuss the various economic issues and tradeoffs 
inherent in this problem. The discussions are presented 
in the context of how a resolution might be reached using 
economic logic instead of guiding the reader to a 
particular conclusion. This approach is necessary for 
two reasons: firs t, much of the quantifiable information 
essential for the problem's evaluation is currently 
unavailable, and second, where an objective approach to 
solve the problem is not available, the value judgments 
required for a solution open elements entirely beyond the 
scope of this paper.
After the economic issues are introduced and 
examined, an explanation of policy decision errors is 
presented which is a supplemental approach to this 
problem. Finally, a summary is presented. The summary 
emphasizes the unknowns, or the particular kinds of 
questions that need answering before a rational policy 
decision can be made on economic grounds.
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ECONOMIC PROBLEMS
Should a particular section of Arkansas land be 
employed as an agriculturally related reservoir (ie., 
farm pond) or as a wetland? This is the fundamental 
question of this paper, and it  is appropriate to consider 
the question in economic terms since economics is the 
science of choices. Many fundamental, and some lesser 
known, economic principles apply to this question. By 
examining this question in light of these economic 
concepts, a better perspective can be achieved through 
which the question can be approached and alternative 
solutions evaluated.
The firs t principle applicable to this land use 
question is sometimes called the principle of the 
"highest alternative use." This principle states that 
a ll resources should be allocated to their most overall 
productive use if  society is to maximize its total 
welfare. That is, if  the total benefits associated with 
a farm pond are greater then the total benefits 
associated with using that particular portion of land as 
a wetland, then a pond should be constructed. Failing 
this test, the land should be allocated to wetlands, or 
even some other alternative.
8
The principle of highest alternative use is easy to 
understand but d ifficult to apply, since quantifying 
"total associated benefits" is a d ifficu lt task, 
especially for the wetlands option. I t  has been well 
documented that wetlands provide many benefits. (See 
Appendix 1.) Included among the benefits that wetlands 
provide are habitats for threatened and endangered 
species, a benefit which accounts for a significant 
percent of the total number of those threatened species 
in this country. (See Appendix 4.) But what is the 
value of saving a particular species from extinction? 
What is i t  worth to increase the number of a particular 
species so that i t  is no longer on the endangered species 
lis t, or no longer on the threatened species list?
These questions are, of course, hypothetical since 
market values do not exist for removing species from 
endangered or threatened lists. However, most people 
would agree that positive value does exist for this type 
of activity, even though it  is not typically determined 
through the market. There are two important consequences 
associated with this fact: firs t, the actual values can 
only be estimated; and second, this feature indicates 
that there is a "market failure" in this situation.
9
Typically the market system w ill not provide a 
"public good" even though its production would increase 
society's overall welfare.12 Public goods have the dual 
properties of being nonrival in consumption and 
nonexcludable in their distribution. The attribute of 
nonrival in consumption is not a particular problem since 
i t  simply means that more than one person can enjoy, or 
consume the good.13
The nonexcludable attribute of a public good does, 
however, present a problem. Once produced, a true public 
good cannot be withheld from consumption. Therefore the 
producer is unable to exclude someone from consuming the 
product, which means the producer is usually unable to be 
rewarded for the production process. The market system 
relies on self interest as the incentive to stimulate 
production. Without the ability to capture returns, or 
get rewarded for one's efforts, there is lit t le  incentive 
for a public good to be produced in the private sector.
12 G e n e ra l ly ,  e c o n o m is ts  a re  p ro n e  to  a d vo ca te  "m a rk e t s o lu t io n s "  s in c e  
p r i v a t e  p r o p e r t y ,  s e l f  i n t e r e s t ,  and co m p e tin g  a l t e r n a t i v e s  can  be d e m o n s tra te d  
to  le a d  to  an e f f i c i e n t  s o lu t io n  when f r e e  m a rk e ts  a re  w o rk in g  p r o p e r ly .  
H ow ever, a p u b l ic  good i s  an exam ple o f  a s i t u a t i o n  w here a m a rk e t sys te m  can  be 
d e m o n s tra te d  to  be i n e f f i c i e n t .
13 A exam ple  o f  a n o n r iv a l  good is  a s u n s e t - many p e o p le  can  e n jo y  i t  
w i t h o u t  i n t e r f e r i n g  o r  d im in is h in g  th e  o th e r s ' e n jo y m e n t, u n l ik e  a fo o d  ite m  
w h ic h  can  be consumed o n ly  b y  one p e rs o n .
10
Furthermore, even though all consumers may find the 
public good desirable, each will be motivated not to pay 
because they cannot be prevented from consuming i t . 14
Many of the benefits associated with wetlands are 
properly classified as public goods. Because of the 
nonexcludable aspects associated with the wetland 
benefits which are public goods, the market system will 
provide no incentive for private land owners to properly 
appraise these benefits when considering the highest 
alternative use for their land. Consequently, society 
w ill be undersupplied with wetlands without some type of 
private market intervention.
There are several approaches to address market 
failures. Unfortunately, no particular technique has 
been identified as generally superior in all situations. 
When considering environmental policies, the possible 
choices range from moral suasion15 to direct control. 
(See Appendix 5.) Each of these approaches has its
11
14 T h is  i s  f r e q u e n t ly  r e fe r r e d  to  as th e  " f r e e - r i d e r "  p ro b le m . S e l f  
in t e r e s t  w i l l  m o t iv a te  each in d iv id u a l  n o t  to  pay because c o n s u m p tio n  w ith o u t  
p a y in g  i s  p o s s ib le .
15 M o ra l s u a s io n  i s  som etim es r e fe r r e d  to  as " ja w -b o n in g "  and r e l i e s  on 
e i t h e r  i n d iv id u a l  m o r a l i t y  o r  s o c ia l  p re s s u re s  to  pe rsuade  p e o p le  to  "do  th e  
r i g h t  t h in g . "  A lth o u g h  t h i s  i s  som etim es e f f e c t i v e ,  i t  can be e x p e n s iv e  and may 
n o t  have la s t i n g  e f f e c t s .
advantages and disadvantages, as outlined by Byrns and 
Stone. (See Appendix 6.)
The effectiveness of an approach to correct a market 
failure can and should also be considered when selecting 
the best alternative solution. Some of these 
considerations have been summarized by Baumol and Oates. 
(See Appendix 7.) A perusal of these appendices with 
the wetlands question in mind w ill yield three basic 
options available for addressing the market failure in 
this situation: (1) governmental control through laws 
and/or regulations, (2) market manipulation by subsidies 
and/or taxes, and (3) providing wetlands benefits through 
public ownership. An elaboration of each of these 
methods is presented in the following paragraphs. 
Governmental Control Through Laws or Regulations. 
Correcting the market's failure to properly account for 
the benefits obtained from wetlands with laws and 
regulations is the approach currently being pursued. 
Notice that Byrns and Stone identify this method as 
"politically most popular" as one of its advantages. 
This could explain why the technique is prevailing, since 
the other two advantages (i.e., 'extremely harmful
12
16 H o r i z o n t a l  e q u i t y  i s  d e f in e d  as " t r e a t i n g  e q u a ls  th e  s a m e ,"  o r  
" i n d i v i d u a l s  who a re  e q u a l i n  a l l  im p o r ta n t  r e s p e c ts  s h o u ld  be  t r e a t e d  e q u a l l y . "
17 C u r r e n t l y ,  th e  B ush  A d m in i s t r a t i o n  i s  a d v o c a t in g  th e  p o l i c y  o f  "n o  n e t  
lo s s "  w i t h  r e s p e c t  t o  th e  q u a n t i t y  o f  w e t la n d s  t o  be m a in t a in e d  n a t i o n a l l y .
18 The lo n g  te rm  g o a l  o f  th e  C o n s e r v a t io n  F o u n d a t io n  i s  "T o  in c r e a s e  th e  
q u a n t i t y  a n d  q u a l i t y  o f  th e  n a t i o n ' s  w e t la n d s  r e s o u r c e  b a s e " ,  P r o t e c t in g  
A m e r ic a 's  W e t la n d s :  An A c t io n  A g e n d a . The F in a l  R e p o r t  o f  th e  N a t io n a l  W e tla n d s  
P o l i c y  F o ru m , p u b l is h e d  b y  th e  C o n s e r v a t io n  F o u n d a t io n ,  1 9 8 8 .
19 J u s t  b e c a u s e  p r o p e r t y  r i g h t s  a re  a t t e n u a te d  b y  la w  d oe s  n o t  i n  and  o f  
i t s e l f  c o n s t i t u t e  " i l l e g a l  t a k in g  o f  p r i v a t e  p r o p e r t y " .  Z o n in g  la w s  a re  a ca se  
i n  p o i n t .
13
pollutants', and 'horizonal equity'16) are not 
applicable in the wetland versus farm pond situation.
I t  is also significant that in Appendix 6, "direct 
regulation" has more listed "disadvantages" (a total of 
six) than any of the other "policy options" listed. 
Particularly troublesome among these six with respect to 
the wetlands situation are the firs t and third items. By 
enforcing a set of regulations based on the policy of "no
net wetlands loss"17 there is a shortage of incentives
18
encouraging landowners to create more wetlands.
The level of intervention in this method of 
correcting a market failure is noticeably high as was 
demonstrated by the popular press excerpts in the 
preceding section. Whether or not private property is
being seized without compensation is a legal question19 .
Nonetheless, i t  is apparent from the fervent flavor of 
these quotations that governmental intervention is 
particularly distasteful to landowners. As a system, 
laws and regulations to protect wetlands lack an internal 
method of allowing substitutes or tradeoffs in 
environmental matters, as is the case with a wetlands 
versus a farm pond decision20.
Finally, there is a wealth transfer consideration. 
Wetlands produce public goods which benefit society 
without compensating the landowner who, by law, must 
forgo alternative uses of the land which would yield more 
wealth. The effect is that the entire cost for providing 
wetland benefits are borne by wetland owners even though 
a ll of society "consumes" these benefits. Therefore the 
landowner is being reduced in wealth to the extent that 
the landowner must forgo recurring returns which could be 
acquired from an alternative use of his property.
Market Manipulation by Subsidies or Taxes. Subsidies can 
be effectively used to correct market failures,
14
20 A fa rm  p o n d  p r o v id e s  many o f  th e  same k in d s  o f  b e n e f i t s ,  e n v ir o n m e n ta l  
and  o t h e r w is e ,  as l i s t e d  i n  A p p e n d ix  3 , Taxonom y o f  M a jo r  W e t la n d  V a lu e s .  
H o w e v e r, a s y s te m  o f  r i g i d  la w s  does n o t  a l lo w  f o r f e i t i n g  som e, b u t  n o t  a l l  o f  
th e  w e t la n d  b e n e f i t s  i n  e xch a n g e  f o r  g a in in g  th e  b e n e f i t s  t h a t  a re  e x c lu s i v e l y  
a s s o c ia t e d  w i t h  a p o n d .
especially in the wetland situation. In fact, this is
currently being pursued:
Under the Conservation Reserve Program, 
farmers are paid about $ 50 per acre each year 
for a contract of 10 years or more to return 
their lands to a natural state.
I t  is interesting to note that Robert Stavins estimated
a $55 value, (as opposed the $50 currently used) in his
1988 Ph.D. dissertation:
This translates into an annual ecological 
benefit level of $55, which is within the 
range of typical annual new (private) returns 
to conversion. This is as we would expect, 
since social optimization would call for 
wetland conversion to be avoided whenever the 
marginal value of externalities is in excess 
of the private returns to conversion2.
Whether or not the $50 or $55 per year rate is
sufficient to induce enough landowners to either put or
convert their land to wetlands is an empirical question
that can only be answered by experience. I t  should be
apparent that some level of subsidy could be determined
which would provide the number of wetlands acres
determined appropriate. Furthermore, i f  such a system
21 " I n c e n t i v e s  G row  F o r  R e p la n t in g  I n  H a rd w o o d s : F a rm e rs  P u t A c o rn s  I n  P o o r 
W e t la n d s , "  A rk a n s a s  G a z e t te . May 2 0 , 1 99 1 .
22 S t a v in s ,  R o b e r t  N. , The W e lfa re  E co n o m ics  o f  A l t e r n a t i v e  R en ew a b le  
R e s o u rc e s  A l t e r n a t i v e s :  F o r e s te d  W e tla n d s  and  A g r i c u l t u r a l  P r o d u c t io n . 
U n p u b l is h e d  P h .D . d i s s e r t a t i o n ,  May 1988, page  102 .
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were in place, there would be l it t le  need for preventing 
the construction of farm ponds from wetlands (or 
potential wetlands) by regulation since the "wetlands 
allowance" system would be providing the correct amount 
of this public good.
The problem of wealth transfer inherent in the 
governmental regulation system would not exist i f  a 
wetlands subsidy system were correctly established. 
Those land owners who elected to receive the wetlands 
subsidy would be paid for by the benefits that wetlands 
provide. Furthermore, the cost for providing wetlands 
benefits would be paid by the "consumers" of these 
benefits, namely society.
Providing Wetlands Benefits Through Public Ownership. 
One other approach to solving the market inefficiency 
problem of wetland allocation is public ownership. Our 
society could embrace the concept of public ownership of 
wetlands which would entail a one-time cost to solve the 
perceived shortage of wetlands, as opposed to incurring 
annual fees as would be required of the subsidy system 
solution. The Federal Government could buy either 
wetlands and/or potential wetlands and convert i t  to 
wetlands. Not only would this method of correcting a
16
market failure avert an ongoing annual fee, but i t  may 
also help prevent other problems of national concern. 
Currently, several agricultural crops are produced in 
surplus. Many crops are in fact produced in surplus 
quantities because of various price support programs or 
direct subsidies. By removing some farmland from 
production and converting i t  to wetlands, the surplus 
output levels could be reduced while simultaneously 
providing part of the financing for public ownership of 
wetlands23. A possible and interesting facet of this 
approach exists. I t  could be administered in conjunction 
with various federal agricultural lending programs 
already in existence. I f  a specific section of 
agricultural real estate passed to government ownership 
because of foreclosure proceedings, i t  could be deeded to 
a "wetland preserve" as opposed to being auctioned. This 
would increase the supply of wetlands benefits enjoyed by 
a ll of society, a public good, and decrease the supply of 
agricultural products, many of which are produced in 
surplus quantities. Furthermore, i t  could be argued that
17
23 S in c e  some g o v e rn m e n t fu n d s  a re  a l r e a d y  a l l o c a t e d  t o  v a r io u s  p r i c e  
s u p p o r t  p ro g ra m s , re m o v in g  fa rm la n d  fro m  p r o d u c t io n  w o u ld  re d u c e  th e  o v e r a l l  c o s t  
o f  th e  s u b s id y  p ro g ra m  and  c o u ld  p r o v id e  f in a n c in g  f o r  p u r c h a s in g  la n d  f o r  a 
w e t la n d  a c t u a t i o n  p ro g ra m .
transferring the land from "production" to wetlands 
status would most likely be efficient since i t  is assumed 
the low productivity of the land contributed to its
foreclosure in the firs t place24.
24 To th e  e x t e n t  t h a t  t h i s  a s s u m p t io n  i s  t r u e ,  th e  la n d  l e a s t  s u i t e d  f o r  
p r o d u c t io n  w o u ld  be  r e a l l o c a t e d  to  w e t la n d s  s t a t u s .
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ALTERNATIVE SOLUTIONS
Specifically, the question addressed by this paper 
is whether or not a particular site in Arkansas should be 
employed as an agriculturally related reservoir (ie., 
farm pond) or a wetland? The preceding section examined 
this question from an economic perspective. However, the 
investigation originated from the implied prospective of 
searching for a "correct solution". Normally such a 
method of inquiry is thoroughly adequate, especially when 
operating with relatively known parameters and relatively 
short time frames. However, the reservoir - wetlands 
choice has considerable uncertainty and time involved. 
The consequences associated with incorrect decisions 
because of these factors could be quite substantial. 
Realizing this, the authors of this report sought an 
alternative solution based upon the errors associated 
with an incorrect decision and the consequences. That 
alternative approach looks for ways to minimize damage or 
costs instead of maximizing benefits. Although this may 
appear to be the same thing, such is not necessarily the 
case. Normally high returns (ie., benefits) are 
associated with high risks (i.e., substantial mistakes). 
Alternatively an individual may accept lower returns for
19
less exposure to risks. I f  only the possible result 
(high benefits) is considered, one may prefer one 
solution while the other (lower risks) is much more 
preferable from an error perspective. When a weighted 
average of the two are considered, one or the other may 
be preferable depending on the assigned weights.25
When considering two different results associated 
with two choices, a two by two matrix can be used to 
clarify the situation. Such a matrix is presented in
Table 1. Note the factors have been dichotomized
26
thereby constraining the outcomes to four.
Of the four decision cells presented in Table 1, two 
are desirable outcomes; whereas, two are not. The task 
at hand is to explore the undesirable outcomes and their 
consequences.
25 A " w e ig h t in g "  i s  s i m i l a r  t o  a s s ig n in g  r i s k s  as w hen e v a lu a t in g  
f i n a n c i a l  in v e s tm e n t  a l t e r n a t i v e s .  H ig h e r  i n t e r e s t  p a y m e n ts  a s s o c ia t e d  w i t h  lo w  
p r o b a b i l i t y  o f  p a y m e n t i s  g e n e r a l l y  n o t  a v a r y  good  c h o ic e .
26 I t ' s  p o s s ib le  t o  s t r u c t u r e  th e  p ro b le m  i n  w ays o t h e r  th a n  l i m i t i n g  th e  
c h o ic e s  and  r e s u l t s  t o  tw o  e a ch  ( i . e . ,  d ic h o t o m iz in g  b o th  f a c t o r s ) .  H o w e v e r, th e  
c h o s e n  a p p ro a c h  s e rv e s  w e l l  s in c e  i t  fo c u s e s  a t t e n t i o n  on  th e  d is c u s s io n ,  and  i s  
a ls o  an  a d e q u a te  m o d e l o f  th e  a d m in i s t r a t i v e  p o l i c i e s  c o n c e r n in g  w e t la n d s  use  
s in c e  th e  r e g u la t i o n s  a re  assum ed to  be  u n i f o r m ly  a p p l ie d .
20
One undesirable outcome is to construct an agri-





































culturally related reservoir on wetlands when the net 
wetlands environmental benefits are greater than the net 
water related benefits. This undesirable outcome is 
currently what the various agencies of the Federal 
Government dealing with this issue are trying to prevent 
by accepting the other policy choice. However, what are 
the likely "down side risks" associated with this 
outcome. I f  every Arkansas farmer with wetlands
21
(regardless of the land's current use status) constructed 
a ll the farm ponds they wanted, what would be the total 
negative effect to the environment? Estimates are 
currently unavailable on the total acreage that would be 
converted to farm ponds. However, i t  can be assumed to 
be relatively small since the regulations restricting 
this are new.27 Furthermore, diverting land from its 
current use would only occur in the private sector when 
the economics justified the expense. This too, suggests 
a limiting factor to the total number of acres which can
be converted to farm ponds in the absence of prohibitive
28
regulations. 28
The second undesirable outcome occurs i f  the net
wetlands environmental benefits are less than the net
water related benefits and the pond is not constructed 
because of a policy decision. I f  a farm pond was
constructed for irrigation water supply (a logical 
assumption in the region of Arkansas which constitutes 
most of the state's wetlands) but was prevented by
22
27 S in c e  la n d  o w n e rs  h a ve  b e e n  f r e e  t o  c o n s t r u c t  fa rm  p o n d s  w i t h o u t  
g o v e rn m e n t i n t e r f e r e n c e  on  t h e i r  p r o p e r t y  u n t i l  r e c e n t l y ,  i t  i s  s a fe  t o  assum e 
t h a t  no  c u r r e n t  " b a c k - lo g "  e x i s t s  f o r  fa rm  p on d  c o n s t r u c t io n .
28 B u i ld i n g  a r e s e r v o i r  i n  e a s te r n  A rk a n s a s ,  ( t h e  r e g io n  o f  th e  s t a t e  w h e re  
w e t la n d s  a re  m o s t p r e v a le n t ) ,  i s  r e l a t i v e l y  e x p e n s iv e .  I t  i s  s a fe  t o  assum e t h a t  
c o n s id e r a b le  th o u g h t  w o u ld  be  in v e s te d  b e fo r e  s t a r t i n g  c o n s t r u c t io n .
regulation, i t  is appropriate to investigate the 
secondary results. These secondary results can be 
thought of as repercussions or echoes from a specific 
policy. Two different, but not necessarily independent, 
secondary results can be identified.
One secondary result of a policy decision error 
associated with restricting the construction of farm 
ponds w ill most likely be po litica l pressure for more 
government constructed water projects. Since existing 
irrigation water supply w ill not be augmented by 
privately funded construction of farm ponds, i t  is 
reasonable to expect some amount of pressure on the 
public sector institutions for publicly financed 
assistance, or augmentation of the agricultural or
irrigation water supplies. The magnitude of this type 
of secondary result is practically impossible to forecast 
and also equally d iff ic u lt to quantify after the fact. 
However, logic suggests that some repercussion would be
29 T h is  a c t i v i t y  c o u ld  m a n ife s t  i t s e l f  i n  re q u e s ts  f o r  c o n s t r u c t in g  p u b l ic  
s e c to r  w a te r  s u p p ly  r e s e r v o i r s ,  o r  f o r  th e  r e d e s ig n a t in g  o f  e x i s t i n g  w a te r  
s u p p l ie s  fro m  o th e r  w a te r  uses to  a g r i c u l t u r a l  i r r i g a t i o n .  A n o th e r  p o s s ib le  
r e a c t io n  to  such  a p o l i c y  d e c is io n  c o u ld  be in c re a s e d  p re s s u re  f o r  d iv e r t i n g  
s u r fa c e  w a te r  fro m  o th e r  re g io n s  o f  th e  c o u n tr y  f o r  i r r i g a t i o n  p u rp o s e s .
23
• 30
highly plausible, and not necessarily desirable.
The other identified secondary result of a policy 
which prevented constructing farm ponds would likely be 
increased usage of underground water supplies for 
agricultural irrigation. In other words, the already 
heavily used Arkansas aquifers would be drained at an 
increased rate. At this time the linkage between such a 
policy decision and the increased rate of water usage 
from the aquifers is not known. However, logic once 
again dictates that such a connection probably exists. 
Furthermore, i t  seems prudent to attempt to collect 
information concerning such a linkage and estimate the 
magnitude and effect of such an increased rate of water 
withdrawal from the aquifers. Preliminary estimates of 
both the wetlands environmental effects and the increased 
rate of the aquifer depletion may prove sufficient to 
select the better policy decision in this situation.31
30 S in c e  w a te r  f o r  a g r i c u l t u r a l  i r r i g a t i o n  i s  b a s ic a l l y  a " p r iv a t e  good" 
as opposed to  a " p u b l ic  g o o d ", i t  w o u ld  be more e c o n o m ic a lly  e f f i c i e n t  to  p ro v id e  
i t  th ro u g h  th e  p r iv a t e  s e c to r .
31 I f  o n ly  o rd e r -o f -m a g n itu d e  e s t im a te s  w ere d e r iv e d  b y  s p e c ia l i s t s ,  th e  
q u e s t io n  may be a n sw e ra b le  w i th o u t  more re s e a rc h . I t  may be t h a t  th e  n e t  damage 
done to  w e tla n d s  ecosys tem  w o u ld  be m in im a l i f  c o n s t r u c t io n  o f  i r r i g a t i o n  
r e s e r v o i r s  was u n r e s t r ic t e d  because such la n d  use c o n v e rs io n  w o u ld  r e p re s e n t  a 
s m a ll p e rc e n t  o f  th e  t o t a l  w e t la n d s . F u rth e rm o re , i t  may be t h a t  r e l a t i v e l y  
s m a ll fa rm  ponds w o u ld  p ro v id e  a s i g n i f i c a n t  p o r t io n  o f  th e  i r r i g a t i o n  w a te r  t h a t  
o th e rw is e  can  be p r e d ic te d  to  be w ith d ra w n  fro m  a q u i f e r s .
24
One last consideration should be mentioned with 
respect to looking at the possible errors. When 
analyzing both errors and secondary effects of policy 
decisions, the "costs" of correcting mistakes should also 
be considered. I t  may be relevant to consider both the 
possibility and the feasib ility of reversing a policy 
decision i f  future events demonstrate that an error was 
made. Again, the opinions and research findings of 
various specialists are required. However, i f  i t  is 
judged that one type of error has results, or secondary 
results, that are irreversible, while the other type of 
error is "correctable" or "reversible" then the prudent 
decision should be one of avoidance. That is, i t  may be 
best to select the policy decision that i f  wrong, can be 
reversed along with its  negative consequences, thereby 
avoiding a policy decision that, i f  wrong, can lead to 
irreversible outcomes. In other words, with respect to 
wetlands, i t  is best to minimize the long-run potential
costs.32
32 As an e xa m p le , i f  i t  i s  p o s s ib le  and f e a s ib le  to  c o n v e r t  fa rm  ponds b a ck  
to  w e t la n d s ,  b u t  im p o s s ib le  to  " re c h a rg e "  a d e p le te d  a q u i f e r ,  th e n  d e c is io n  
m akers may w a n t to  p o n d e r th e s e  " c o s ts  o f  c o r r e c t in g  and e r r o r "  c o n s id e r a t io n s .
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CONCLUSIONS
I t  is highly unlikely that a "scientifica lly- 
derived" 33 answer is possible to the question raised in 
this paper. The authors do believe, however, that 
certain valuable contributions have been provided in this 
report for policy makers to consider.
With respect to the requirements associated with the 
"404" permits for constructing agriculturally related 
reservoirs in Arkansas, certain elements were singled out 
for consideration. First, i f  there were no permit 
requirements, the landowner is going to use the land in 
its  highest valued alternative. This w ill maximize total 
economic welfare of society from a private property 
perspective i f  the landowner has correctly evaluated the 
economic benefits and costs. In other words, i f  the 
total economic benefits associated with land being used 
as a farm pond are greater than the total economic 
benefits of the same land remaining as wetlands, then the 
pond should be constructed.
Earlier in this report i t  was pointed out that there 
could be a problem with the private property approach
33 The te rm  " s c i e n t i f i c a l l y - d e r i v e d "  i s  used  h e re  to  mean a v a lu e  f r e e  
m ethod o f  i n v e s t ig a t io n  and d is c o v e ry .
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from an externalities point of view. Externalities exist 
when the private calculations of benefits or costs d iffer 
from the calculated benefits or costs to a ll of society. 
The value of the benefits to society of land remaining as 
wetlands may be undervalued. I f  so, ponds may be 
constructed based upon only private economic 
considerations which would not be economically desirable 
from a societal view point. This report noted that such 
action would constitute an error. I f  the "404" permit 
requirements are constraining on the behavior of private 
landowners in such situations then the "404" permit has 
helped to correct the occurrence of this type of error.
This report also pointed out a second possible 
error. I f  the private economic benefits of constructing 
a pond exceeded the total economic benefits, including 
a ll societal benefits of the land remaining as wetlands, 
then the pond should be constructed. I f  the reservoir is 
not constructed (because of "404" permit requirements) 
then this is also an error.
This report attempted to address the policy 
considerations which would have to be made to correct the 
above mentioned error. Obviously, i f  the reservoir 
should have been constructed but wasn't, then this error
27
is easily rectified by building the pond. I f  the pond 
was constructed but should not have been, then the 
correction would require that the land be allowed to 
revert back to its  original state of being wetlands. 
Although, this sounds somewhat d ifficu lt, the literature 
indicates that allowing both farm land and ponds to 
revert back to their natural state is not as d iff ic u lt as 
most imagine.
The secondary effects of the above error were also 
mentioned in this report. I f  the pond was constructed 
but should not have been, there are s t i l l  secondary 
benefits to be considered. The reservoir helps to either 
recharge or to save the underground aquifer being used 
for irrigation. These benefits are sometimes ignored in 
policy decisions. I f  these secondary benefits are 
included in the analysis, then the error may disappear, 
or at a minimum decrease in importance.
As with a ll reports i t  seems that the more analysis 
one does the more questions one discovers which should be 
addressed. This report is not different. As can be 
ascertained by reading only the conclusions there are 
many very serious areas of study which s t i l l  must be 
undertaken. I t  is hoped that other scientific fields
28
w ill help to provide the information needed for better 
economic analysis to be developed in the future.
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APPENDIX 1
F IV E  EXAMPLES OF WETLANDS D E F IN IT IO N S
U .S .  F i s h  a n d  W i l d l i f e  S e r v ic e  "Lands transitional 
between terrestria l and aquatic systems where the water 
table is usually at or near the surface or the land is 
covered by shallow water. . . "Wetlands must have one or 
more of the following three attributes: (1) at least 
periodically, the land supports predominantly untrained 
hydric soil, and (3) the substrate is nonsoil and is 
saturated with water or covered by shallow water at some 
time during the growing season of each year."
U . S .  E n v i r o n m e n t a l  P r o t e c t i o n  A g e n c y  a n d  t h e  U . S .  A rm y  
C o rp s  o f  E n g in e e r s  "Those areas that are inundated or 
saturated by surface or groundwater at a frequency and 
duration sufficient to support, and that under normal 
circumstances do support, a prevalence of vegetation 
typically adapted for life  in saturated soil conditions. 
Wetlands generally include swamps, marshes, bogs, and 
similar areas."
S t a t e  o f  W is c o n s in  "Those areas where water is at, near 
or above the land surface long enough to be capable of 
supporting aquatic or hydrophytic vegetation, and which 
have soils indicative of wet conditions."
S t a t e  o f  C o n n e c t i c u t  "Wetlands means land, including 
submerged land, which consist(s) of any soil types 
designated as poorly drained, very poorly drained, 
alluvial or flood plain by the National Cooperative Soils 
Survey, as may be amended from time to time, by the Soil 
Conservation Service of the U.S. Department of 
Agriculture."
S t a t e  o f  C a l i f o r n i a  "Lands within Coastal Zone which 
may be covered periodically or permanently with shallow 
water and include saltwater marshes, freshwater marshes, 
open or closed brackish marshes, swamps, mudflats, and 
fens."
Source : Salvesen, David Wetlands: Mitigating and 
Regulating Development Impacts. Washington D.C., the 
Urban Land Institute, 1990, page 10.
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APPENDIX 2
N e w s p a p e r  A r t i c l e  
A r k a n s a s  G a z e t t e ,  M ay 1 7 ,  1 9 9 1
P a g e  1 -  "B A T T L E  B U IL D IN G  OVER WHAT TO DO W ITH  
W ETLANDS" WASHINGTON - Arkansas farmer David Yokum's 
message to a Senate committee was a simple one Thursday: 
The federal government shouldn't be able to keep a fellow 
from working his own property by invoking wetlands 
regulations. "I don't think the government should be 
allowed to s tif le  the farm economy due to wetlands," 
Yokum, who farms in Lake Village, told Sen. Dale Bumpers' 
Senate Small Business Committee. But the message from 
Nancy Delamar, the director of the Arkansas Nature 
Conservancy, was just as simple. "Wetlands represent a 
unique asset that once lost cannot be recaptured," she 
told Bumpers and his colleagues. The United States, she 
warned, is losing about 450,000 acres of valuable flood- 
control and w ild life  breeding grounds each year, so they 
must be protected or they w ill disappear.
The opposing stands taken by Yokum and Delamar 
represent what could erupt into the biggest environmental 
battle of the year in Washington. I t 's  over whether 
tough federal regulations to protect environmentally 
sensitive wetlands w ill remain intact or be watered down. 
Farmers, developers and many small-businessmen argue that 
current restrictions are so prohibitive and the 
bureaucratic administration of them so cumbersome that 
development is stifled and basic property rights denied.
And several bills-including one authored by Rep. John 
Paul Hammerschmidt, R-Ark., and one co-sponsored by Rep. 
Beryl Anthony, D-Ark.-have been introduced to ease the 
restrictions. But Delamar and other environmentalists 
fear that such legislation w ill gut the regulations and 
permit the wholesale destruction of important wetlands. 
"This is one of the most complex issues this country is 
going to have to deal with," said Bumpers, who said he 
hopes to find some middle ground.
The battle over wetlands isn 't new. I t 's  just coming 
to a head in Congress. In the 1970s, Congress adopted a 
Clean Water Act that required people to get permits to 
dump materials into water. The courts since then
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interpreted the laws to include marshy, swampy wetlands 
areas. And on his way to the White House, George Bush, 
who said he wanted to be known as the environmental 
president, said he wanted "no net loss" of wetlands.
The issue was no big national deal, however, un til 
last year when the four federal agencies responsible for 
overseeing wetlands issued their definitions of what 
constituted wetlands and began enforcing them.
Farmers and developers suddenly found their property 
with wetlands designations and that they needed 
government permits to plant or build a house on certain 
pieces of property. Worse, they had trouble getting 
straight answers or permits from the agencies. And i f  
they ignored the process or even inadvertently broke the 
law, they found the penalties were severe.
"I personally was about put into bankruptcy by 
wetlands regulations," Michael Zunich, a North 
Ridgeville, Ohio, homebuilder told Bumpers' committee 
Thursday. The situation was especially out of control in 
Arkansas, where much of the eastern portion of the state 
f i t  the definition of wetlands. In response, Bumpers and 
several other farm-state senators, including Sen. David 
Pryor, D-Ark., got the federal bureaucracies to agree to 
an exemption for farmland that has been t il le d  or worked 
- even i f  i t  f i t  within the wetlands definition. 
Congress also wrote into last year's version of the farm 
b i l l  a program that would pay farmers to put wetlands 
into a permanent easement that they would agree not to 
touch. But that didn't solve a ll the problems for 
farmers who wanted to otherwise develop their land. Nor 
did i t  answer the concerns of developers or other 
businessmen who wanted to build or expand. Permits s t i l l  
were required of them. After the furor, the federal 
bureaucracy went back to the drafting table and is about 
to issue new guidelines for what constitutes wetlands. 
Bumpers obtained a copy of the new manual late Wednesday. 
And while he hasn't had an opportunity to study i t ,  some 
environmentalists were complaining Thursday that more 
than 10 million acres across the nation would lose 
federal protection new definitions.
That's the amount of lost wetlands that James Tripp, 
counsel for the Environmental Defense Fund, said the
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nation really should restore rather than lose over the 
next 10 to 20 years for flood control, wildlife breeding 
habitat and purer water. Many agricultural and business 
interests fear that the new manual w ill not solve their 
problems. They want a ll wetlands areas cataloged in 
three categories based on how valuable they really are 
for various purposes. But environmental groups fear that 
approach would lead to greater destruction s t i l l .  And, 
as Delamar said, wetlands once lost are gone forever.
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APPENDIX 3
TAXONOMY OF MAJOR WETLAND VALUES
FISH AND WILDLIFE VALUES
Fish and Shellfish Habitat 
Waterfowl and Other Bird Habitat 







Chemical and Nutrient Absorption
Aquatic Productivity
Microclimate Regulator
World Climate (Ozone Layer)
SOCIO-ECONOMIC VALUES 
Flood Control 
Wave Damage Protection 
Erosion Control
Groundwater Recharge and Water Supply 
Timber and Other Natural Products 
Energy Source (Peat)
Livestock Grazing 
Fishing and Shellfishing 
Hunting and Trapping 
Recreation 
Aesthetics
Education and Scientific Research
SOURCE: Tiner, Ralph W., Jr. Wetlands of the United States: 
Current Status and Recent Trends. Washington D.C.: U.S. 










Percent of U.S. 
Total Threatened 
Endangered
Plants 95 3 %
Mammals 5 15 %
Birds 22 31 %
Reptiles 4 31 %
Amphibians 3 50 %
Fish 22 54 %
Source: Mitsch, William J. and James G. Gosselink, Wetlands. Van
Morstrand Renhold, New York, 1986, page 399.
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APPENDIX 5
APPROACHES TO ENVIRONMENTAL POLICY
POLICY INSTRUMENTS
1. MORAL SUASION (publicity, social pressures, etc.)
2. DIRECT CONTROLS
A. Regulations limiting the permissible levels of emissions.
B. Specification of mandatory processes or equipment
3. MARKET PROCESSES
A. Taxation of environmental damage
1. Tax rates based on evaluation of social damage
2. Tax rates designed to achieve present standards 
of environmental quality.
B. Subsidies
1. Specified payments per unit of reduction of 
waste emissions.
2. Subsidies to defray costs of damage-control 
equipment.
C. Issue of limited quantities of pollution 'licenses'
1. Sale of licenses to the highest bidders
2. Equal distribution of licenses with legalized resale
D. Refundable deposits against environmental damage
E. Allocation of Property Rights to give individuals a 
proprietary interest in improved environmental quality.
4. GOVERNMENT INVESTMENTS
A. Damage prevention facilities (e.g., municipal 
treatment plants)
B. Regenerative activities (e.g. reforestation, 
slum clearances)
C. Dissemination of information (e.g., pollution-control 
techniques, opportunities for profitable recycling)
D. Research
E. Education
1. Of the general public






A. Payment by those who cause the damage
B. Payment by those who benefit from improvements
C. General revenues
3. ENFORCEMENT MECHANISM
A. Regulatory organizations or police
B. Citizen suits (with or without sharing of fines)
Source: Baumol, William J. & Wallace E. Oates, Economics,
Environmental Policy, and the Quality of Life. 
Prentice-Hall, Englewood Cliffs, N.J. 1979, p 218.
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APPENDIX 6
SUMMARY & EVALUATION OF VARIOUS ENVIRONMENTAL PO LICY OPTIONS
P o l i c y  O p t io n A d v a n ta g e s D is a d v a n ta g e s
M o ra l
S u a s io n
*Least disruptive to 
market processes. 
*Educates & sensitizes 







M a rk e t




*Requires little  govern­
ment intervention.
*Reduces pollution to a 
given level depending 
upon the policy 
established.
*Relatively easy to 
administer.
*Private lawsuits enable 
individuals harmed to 
recover.
*Sometimes hard to
develop good estimates 
of external costs for 
particular pollutants 
and polluters.
*License to pollute is 
politically unpopular.
*It may be difficult to 
prove in a lawsuit who 
damaged whom.
*Lawsuits can be lengthy 
and expensive.
*Typically requires a 
closed environment to 
administer effectively
T a x  P e n a l t ie s  





*Relatively easy to 
administer.
*Largest polluters have 
greatest incentives 
to reduce pollution.
*Generates revenue to 
further clean up the 
environment.




can be expensive, 
especially when large 
numbers of polluters 
are involved.
*Output taxes provide
incentive to clean up 
pollution or adopt 
cleaner technology.
D i r e c t
R e g u la t io n




*Standards can preserve 




*Once Standard is met, 
polluter has no 
incentive to further 
reduce pollution. 
*Administrative
regulation often quite 




required to administer 
*Does not generate its 
own revenue.
*Can become captive
agency of particular 
special-interest group
Source: Byrns, Ralph T., Gerald W. Stone Economics 4th Ed.




C RITER IA  FOR EVALUATING ENVIRONMENTAL PO LIC IES
1) DEPENDABILITY — How reliable is the approach in 
achieving its objective? Are its workings fa irly 
certain and automatic or does i t  depend on a number 
of unpredictable elements?
2) PERMANENCE — Is the program likely to be effective 
only so long as i t  captures public interest, or can 
i t  be expected to endure even when other issues 
have seized the attention of the media and the 
public?
3) ADAPTABILITY OF ECONOMIC GROWTH — Is the program 
flexible enough to adapt to normal expansion in 
economic activities and population growth, both of 
which tend to accentuate problems of environmental 
damage?
4) EQUITY — Does the program divide its financial 
burdens among individuals and enterprises fairly?
5) INCENTIVES FOR MAXIMUM EFFORT — Does the program 
offer inducements to individuals or enterprises to 
minimize environmental damage, or does i t  encourage 
no more than barely acceptable behavior?
6) ECONOMY — Does the program achieve its results at 
relatively low costs to society or does i t  waste 
resources?
7) POLITICAL ATTRACTIVENESS — Is the method likely to 
recommend itse lf to legislators and to voters?
8) MINIMAL INTERFERENCE WITH PRIVATE DECISIONS —Does 
the method te ll the individual or the businessman 
exactly what to do, or does i t  offer the broadest 
scope of choices consistent with protection of the 
environment?
Source: Baumol, William J. & Wallace E. Oates, 
Economics. Environmental Policy, and the Quality of Life. 
Prentice-Hall, Englewood Cliffs, N.J. 1979, p 232.
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2,333,000 26,470 99 %
California
5,000,000 450,000 91 %
Nebraska's Rainwater Basin
94,000 8,460 91 %
Mississippi Alluvial Plain
24,000,000 5,200,000 78 %
Michigan
11,200,000 3,200,000 71 %
North Dakota
5,000,000 2,000,000 60 %
Minnesota
18,400,000 8,700,000 53 %
Louisiana's Forested Wetlands
11,300,000 5,635,000 50 %
Connecticut's Coastal Marshes
30,000 15,000 50 %
North Carolina's Pocosins
2,500,000 1,503,000 40 %
South Dakota
2,000,000 1,300,000 35 %
Wisconsin
10,000,000 6,750,000 32 %
Source: Salvesen, David Wetlands: Mitigating and 
Regulating Development Impacts. Washington D.C., the 
Urban Land Institute, 1990 , page 19.
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APPENDIX 9
S IZE  DISTRIBUTION OF ARKANSAS FARMS IN  THE LOWER 
M IS S IS S IP P I ALLUVIAL P LA IN / 1935 AND 1982
Size Class 
(acres) 1935 1982
less then 49 58.7 % 25.2 %
50 - 99 21.0 % 19.3 %
100 - 179 13.6 % 16.2 %
180 - 259 3.5 % 10.4 %
260 - 499 2.3 % 13.4 %
500 - 999 0.6 % 9.2 %
1000 - 4999 0.2 % 6.0 %
over 5000 0.0 % 0.2 %
SOURCE: Starvins, Robert Norman, "The Welfare 
Economics of Alternative Renewable Resource 
Strategies: Forested Wetlands and Agricultural 




FOREST AND AGRICULTURAL ACREAGE T H IR T Y -S IX  INTERIOR  
COUNTIES* LOWER M IS S IS S IP P I ALLUVIAL P LA IN , 1 9 34 -1 9 84
Year Forest Acreage **














SOURCE: Starvins, Robert Norman, "The Welfare Economics 
of Alternative Renewable Resource Strategies: Forested 
Wetlands and Agricultural Production," (1988) Ph.D. 
Dissertation Page 175.
* The 3 6 counties are: ARKANSAS: Chicot, Clay,
Craighead, Crittenden, Cross, Desha, Greene, Lee, 
Mississippi, Phillips, Poinsett, St. Francis, Woodruff, 
LOUISIANA: Concordia, East Carroll, Franklin, Iberville, 
Madison, Pointe Coupee, Richland, St. Charles, St. James, 
St. John/Bapt., Tensas, West Baton Rouge, West Carroll, 
MISSISSIPPI: Bolivar, Coahoma, Humphreys, Issaquena,
Leflore, Quitman, Sharkey, Sunflower, Tunica, Washington 
** Thousands of acres 
*** Soybeans, Cotton, Rice, Corn
APPENDIX 11
OTHER FEDERAL LAWS AFFECTING WETLANDS
The Coastal Zone Management Act of 1972 ( 1 6  U.S.C. 
Sections 1451 et seq.) Provides financial incentives 
for states to adopt federally approved coastal zone 
management programs to protect coastal resources, which 
include beaches, barrier islands, barrier reefs, dunes, 
and wetlands. Federal actions, such as offshore o il 
leasing, must conform with a federally approved state 
program. I f  not, the state may "veto" the federal 
action. This is the so-called "consistency requirement," 
which has been the focus of considerable debate and 
litigation between the states and the federal government.
Approved state programs must: 1) delineate the coastal 
zone boundary; 2) indicate which activities are 
permissible within the defined coastal zone; 3) inventory 
special resource areas requiring protection; and 5) 
include sufficient legal authority to implement the 
program.
About 24 of the 30 coastal states, including the Great 
Lake Sates, have federally approved coastal zone 
management programs.
The Endangered Species Act of 1973 ( 1 6  U.S.C. Sections 
1531 et seq.) Enacted to protect rare plants and 
animals, such as the California Condor, that are in 
danger of becoming extinct. The act requires federal 
agencies, in consultation with the U.S. Fish and Wildlife 
Service and the National Marine Fisheries Service, to 
ensure that any action authorized w ill not jeopardize 
endangered or threatened species directly, nor hurt or 
destroy their habitat, including wetlands. I t  also 
prohibits any person from "taking" an endangered species. 
Taking includes hunting, trapping, harming, or harassing 
such species.
The National Flood Insurance Act of 1968 M2 U.S.C. 
Sections 4001-4128) Provides financial incentives for 
communities to adopt federally approved floodplain 
management programs. Administered by the Federal 
Emergency Management Agency (FEMA), the program utilizes 
a financial carrot and stick to coax communities into 
adopting programs that w ill ultimately reduce the loss of 
lives and property from floods. For communities with 
approved programs, the federal government provides 
subsidized flood insurance to those who own property in 




participate in a program to regulate future floodplain 
uses are ineligible for federal disaster assistance (the 
s tick). In general, the programs apply to new and 
rebuilt construction in floodplains, and usually include 
restrictions on the type and location of development. 
Although not its  primary focus, the program covers 
development in wetlands, since nearly a ll coastal and 
most inland wetlands occur in floodplains.
The Coastal Barrier Resources Act of 1982 (16 U.S.C. 
Sections 3501-3510) The act restricts, and in some 
cases eliminates, federal subsidies for building on 
undeveloped coastal barriers. The act does not prohibit 
development on coastal barriers, but i t  does prohibit 
federal expenditures and financial assistance, such as 
federal flood insurance, for such development.
Fish and Wildlife Coordination Act of 1934, amended 1946, 
1958. 1977 (U.S.C. 661-667e) The act requires the Corps, 
to consider the comments of federal and state fish and 
w ild life  agencies, such as the U.S. Fish and Wildlife 
Service or the National Marine Fisheries Service, before 
issuing a Section 404 permit.
Source: Salvesen, David Wetlands: Mitigating and
Regulating Development Impacts. Washington 




STATE WETLANDS PROGRAMS AT A GLANCE
Alabama Permits required under its  Coastal Area 
Management Act for activities (dredging, dumping, etc.) 
that alter tida l movement or damage flora and fauna.
Alaska Regulates activities in its  coastal zone under the 
state Coastal Management Act. Federal lands exempt.
Arizona No specific wetlands protection program.
Arkansas No specific wetlands protection program.
California Statewide Coastal Commission regulates a ll 
development activities in the coastal zone, except around 
San Francisco Bay which is regulated by BCDC.
Colorado No specific wetlands protection program.
Connecticut Permit required for just about any alteration 
of coastal or inland wetlands, including dredging, 
removal f i l l ,  and construction. A ll wetlands mapped. 
Program administered by local governments. Most 
agricultural activities exempt.
Delaware Regulates activities in coastal wetlands, 
including dredging, f il l in g , bulkheading, e tc., under its  
Wetlands Act. Essentially forbids construction of 
private, nonwater-dependent projects in tida l wetlands. 
Delaware is developing a freshwater wetlands protection 
law.
Florida Regulates activities (dredge and f i l l )  in both 
freshwater and coastal wetlands.
Georgia Regulates activities (dredge, f i l l ,  and drain) in 
salt marshes under its  Coastal Marshlands Protection Act.
Hawaii Regulates development (dredging, removal, grading, 
construction, etc.) in the coastal zone under its  Coastal 
Zone Management Act. Permit required from county coastal 
management authorities. Establishes shoreline setbacks 




Idaho No specific wetlands protection program.
Indiana No specific wetlands protection program.
Illinois No specific wetlands protection program. 
Regulates some activities in floodways under its  Rivers, 
Lakes, and Streams Act of 1911.
Iowa No specific wetlands protection program. Has active 
wetlands acquisition program by which state purchases and 
restores wetlands, primarily prairie potholes. Wetlands 
protection b i l l  introduced to legislature
Kansas No specific wetlands protection program.
Kentucky No specific wetlands protection program.
Louisiana Under its  State and Local Coastal Resources 
Management Act, state and/or local permits required for 
activities (dredge and f i l l )  in coastal wetlands.
Maine Permit required for activities that affect 
"protected natural resources," including coastal and 
inland wetlands. Freshwater wetlands under 10 acres 
exempt. Also, local governments establish setbacks for 
developments along freshwater and coastal wetlands.
Maryland Two programs: one regulating dredge and f i l l  of 
tida l wetlands, the other regulating a wide variety of 
activities (such as removal, alteration, destruction of 
plants, grading) in freshwater wetlands. Both programs 
generally exempt agriculture and forestry. Established 
a no-net-loss policy for nontidal wetlands.
Massachusetts Wetlands program administered by local 
conservation commissions. Regulates activities (removal, 
f i l l ,  dredge, and alteration) in both freshwater and 
coastal wetlands.
Michigan The only state to "assume" the federal 404 
program. Regulates development in wetlands under a 





Minnesota Permits required for any work in wetlands, 
under its  Protected Waters and Wetlands Permit Program. 
Regulates lakes, ponds, cattail marshes, and open water 
marshes over 10 acres in rural areas and over 2.5 acres 
in cities. Certain uses prohibited outright, such as 
f i l l in g  wetlands for a parking lot. Generally exempts 
agricultural drainage.
Mississippi Regulates dredging, dumping, f i l l in g , 
destruction of flora, and construction in coastal 
wetlands. Many activities exempt.
Missouri No specific wetlands protection program.
Montana No specific wetlands protection program.
Nebraska No specific wetlands protection program
Nevada No specific wetlands protection program.
New Hampshire Permit required for any alteration of 
coastal or freshwater wetlands. Regulations stric ter for 
coastal wetlands.
New Jersey Regulates development in both freshwater and 
coastal wetlands. Freshwater wetlands program similar, 
but broader, than the 404 program.
New Mexico No specific wetlands protection program.
New York Under a variety of laws, the state regulates 
development in freshwater and tidal wetlands. Generally, 
the freshwater wetlands program applies to wetlands of 
12.4 acres and larger, a ll of which the state has mapped. 
Freshwater wetlands of less than 12.4 acres are covered 
i f  of "unusual local importance." Local governments can 





North Carolina Under its  dredge and f i l l  act, a permit is 
required to f i l l  or excavate tida l wetlands. In 
addition, under its  Coastal Area Management Act, the 
state also regulates development in areas of 
environmental concern, which include wetlands, estuaries, 
and floodplains within the coastal zone.
North Dakota Wetlands program focuses on agricultural 
drainage. Permits required to drain a wetland within a 
watershed of 80 acres or more. Requires replacement of 
drained wetland on a one-for-one basis.
Ohio No specific wetlands protection program. Ohio's 
"antidegradation policy" under its  water-quality 
standards requires mitigation for wetlands alterations 
permitted by the Corps.
Oklahoma No specific wetlands protection program.
Oregon Under its  F il l and Removal Act, a permit is 
required to f i l l  or remove any material from "waters of 
the state," which include inland and coastal wetlands. 
In addition, local governments incorporate statewide 
planning goals, which include wetlands protection.
Pennsylvania Under its  Dam Safety and Encroachments Act, 
the state regulates encroachment on bodies of water, 
which includes draining, f il l in g , or enlarging wetlands. 
Regulations are more stringent for "important" wetlands. 
Exemptions for cutting vegetation.
Rhode Island The state regulates development in both 
coastal and freshwater wetlands. Coastal wetlands are 
more stringently regulated than freshwater wetlands. 
Coastal program establishes six wetlands categories and 
identifies permitted uses in each. Freshwater program 
exempts small freshwater wetlands (i.e ., swamps under 




South Carolina Under its  Coastal Management Act, the 
state regulates activities (dredge, f i l l ,  drain, etc.) in 
"c ritica l areas," which include coastal waters and 
tidelands. Freshwater wetlands unregulated by the state.
South Dakota No specific wetlands protection program.
Tennessee No specific wetlands act, but the state 
regulates any alteration to "waters of the state," 
including wetlands, under its  Water Quality Control Act. 
No development allowed in outstanding wetlands. Most 
agricultural activities exempt.
Texas No specific wetlands protection program.
Utah No specific wetlands protection program.
Vermont The state Water Resources Board designates 
"wetlands of state significance" and, instead of 
requiring permits, the board establishes allowable uses 
in those wetlands. The board is authorized to regulates 
activities that threaten state-protected values such as 
flood control, water quality, w ild life  habitat, and 
aesthetics.
Washington Under its  Shoreline Management Act, the state 
regulates development in waters of the state, including 
wetlands. Although not the main focus of the act, the 
state has jurisdiction over wetlands associated with 
tida l areas and over large streams and lakes. Permits 
issued by local governments, with final approval required 
by the state. Only local approval needed for very small 





Virginia Regulates activities in coastal wetlands under 
the Wetlands Act. Permits issued either by state or by 
local governments that adopt the state's Wetland Zoning 
Ordinance. The act provides standards and policies for 
evaluating wetlands development proposal.
West Virginia No specific wetlands protection program.
Wisconsin Wisconsin's shoreland Management Program 
requires each county to adopt state-approved zoning 
ordinance for shorelands, defined as 1,000 feet from lake 
or pond and 3 00 feet from river or stream. The ordinance 
includes a shoreland-wetlands zoning d is tric t, which 
permits certain activities such as recreation and 
forestry, and prohibits a ll others, such as dredge and 
f i l l .
Wyoming No specific wetlands protection program.
Source : Salvesen, David Wetlands: Mitigating and 
Regulating Development Impacts. Washington D.C., the 




1. Limit wetland uses to those with minimal impact on 
natural values (e.g., parks, growing of natural 
crops)
2. Limit development densities (e.g., require large lo t 
sizes)
3. Cluster development on upland sites to protect 
sensitive and hazardous areas
4. Elevate structures on pilings or other open work
5. Route access roads, sewers, and water supply systems 
around the most sensitive areas
6. Fence wetlands and floodplains, where appropriate, to 
protect natural vegetation and water quality and to 
reduce erosion
7. Replant wetland and other vegetation where
destruction of vegetation cannot be avoided
8. Reduce erosion in exposed areas through rip-rap or 
other measures
9. Construct fish pools in channelization projects; 
insta ll fish ladders at dams
10. Manage game to enhance and reestablish species
11. Use s i l t  fences and similar measures to control 
runoff from construction sites; construct detention 
ponds to trap sediments
12. Operate dams to provide sufficient flows for 
downstream fish and w ild life  and to periodically 
flush wetlands
13. Construct new wetlands and other w ild life  areas by 
diking, land acquisition, or other means to 
compensate for unavoidable losses
Source: Burke, Erik, Tiner, and Hazel, Protecting 
Nontidal Wetlands. American Planning Association Chicago 
I I ., 1988, page 13.
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